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Abstract
This Article considers the development of urban law. It suggests that urban law is socio-legal in its explo-
ration of law’s role in the production of the city and urban life, enabling the study of the city as a distinctive
legal entity. Addressing the question “why urban law?,” this Article considers similar debates in geography
and urban policy before developing three arguments for studying urban law: (i) urbanism is a vibrant field
of scholarly research; (ii) socio-legal research can take an explicitly normative focus in pursuit of improving
urban quality; and (iii) at a city scale we can investigate governance concepts of territory, sovereignty and
jurisdiction. One of the difficulties with urban law is finding the right level of analysis, covering sufficient
legal and empirical detail whilst also making the city legible at an urban scale. Although this tension pro-
duces imperfect compromises, accepting the limitations means that we can begin the shared task of devel-
oping an intellectual infrastructure, a grammar, for the study of urban law.
Keywords: Urban law; socio-legal studies; law and society
A. Introduction
The extent of urban life is extraordinary. Half of humanity, 3.5 billion people, now live in cities
with numbers expected to rise to over sixty percent by 2030.1 Employment opportunities, cultural
diversity and connections attract people to urban areas, producing both increased density and
sprawl. Yet cities are not just the sum of their populations—they have distinctive social, spatial,
cultural, political, military, and economic characteristics. Writing in 1931, Chicago sociologist
Lewis Wirth highlighted the capacity of cities for soft governance:
The influences which cities exert upon the social life of man are greater than the ratio of the
urban population would indicate, for the city is not only in ever larger degrees the dwelling-
place and the workshop of modern man, but it is the initiating and controlling center of
economic, political, and cultural life that has drawn the most remote parts of the world into
its orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples, and activities into a cosmos.2
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Urbanism, for Wirth, is a way of life, a collective endeavor, a “complex of traits which makes up
the characteristic mode of life in cities.”3
And yet despite the acknowledged significance of cities to modern society, or urbanism as a
process, urban law remains under-developed as a field of study. Although scholars investigate
housing, environmental, protest, or economic development law in cities, there is—so far—a rel-
ative lack of scholarship examining how cities produce regulation, rules, and policies and, corre-
spondingly, how regulation, rules, and policies co-produce cities. Drawing on a wide range of legal
methodologies—socio-legal, comparative, or doctrinal analysis—urban law can study the city as a
distinctive legal entity.
Urban law is most identifiable as a cohesive sub-discipline in the United States. Here, scholars
analyze both individual legal aspects of housing, zoning or planning, licensing, sustainability, con-
sumer protection, poverty, race, and data law, as well as relationships between national and state
government. Even in America, however, Nestor Davidson, Director of Fordham’s Urban Law
Center, calls for “a renewed appreciation of urban law as a distinctive enterprise,” registering a
decline in forty years of scholarship since Fordham’s Urban Law Journal was launched.4
This apparent absence of scholarship raises an academic question: How should we understand
urban law? In Europe, there are few programmatic academic investigations, with the notable
exception of Jean Bernard Auby’s pathbreaking Droit de la Ville, praised as “le seul manuel
dèdié à cet objet,” synthesizing materials for lawyers and non-lawyers alike.5 International lawyers,
including Helmut Philipp Aust in Germany, have raised questions about how cities are beginning
to assert themselves as internationally relevant actors through addressing climate change law or
human rights implementation.6 European criminologists have long studied the city and its effects,
suggesting that “to understand crime has been in many ways to understand the city.”7 Legal and
critical theorists have tilted the lens, with Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos crafting an
understanding of the city as a lawscape—embodying mutuality, and grasped as “the ever
receding horizon of prior invitation by the one (the law/the city) to be conditioned by the other
(the city/the law)”8, capturing the interaction between law and urban living. Other than these
interventions, however, European urban law is still largely underdeveloped. To adapt the words
of James Baldwin, one of America’s most famous expatriates, European cities have “a sense of the
mysterious and inexorable limits of life,” but we have still to inculcate a sufficiently American
“sense of life’s possibilities.”9
When studying cities, we often see urban analyses couched in disciplinary specialties.
Geologists see rock formations, healthcare experts identify the scope for pandemic transmissions,
economists and political geographers focus on financial flows, engineers appreciate load risks,
historians track past lives and events, while social scientists observe urban cultures and politics.
Few, so far, have looked for the legal gridlines that structure the city, producing relationships
between cities and citizens, states, and national parliaments. Legal frameworks govern housing,
transportation, and infrastructure, regulatory provisions and practices are critical to understand-
ing policing, cultural innovation, and promotion of sustainable development. While urban studies
3Id. at 4–7.
4Nestor Davidson,What is Urban Law Today? An Introductory Essay in Honor of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1579, 1579 (2016).
5JEAN-BERNARD AUBY, DROIT DE LA VILLE: DU FONCTIONNEMENT JURIDIQUE DES VILLES AU DROIT À LA VILLE 348 (2016);
Julien Betaille, Jean-Bernard Auby, Droit de la ville – Du fonctionnement juridique des villes au droit à la Ville, 2013, 38 REVUE
JURIDIQUE DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT 385, 385 (2013).
6H.P. Aust, Shining Cities on the Hill? The Global City, Climate Change, and International Law, 26 EUR. J. INT. L. 255, 278
(2015).
7ROWLAND ATKINSON & GARETH MILLINGTON, URBAN CRIMINOLOGY: THE CITY, DISORDER, HARM AND SOCIAL CONTROL
1 (2018).
8ANDREAS PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, LAW AND THE CITY 10 (2007).
9JAMES BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME 12 (2013).
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have long been driven by debates about the appropriate level of analysis, balancing micro with
macro, case studies, and theory, legal analysis is often beyond this cross-disciplinary boundary.
By drawing regulation, rules, and policies into urban studies, urban law can contribute to these
cross-disciplinary debates, asking how cities are legally co-produced, managing themselves, their
residents—both human and otherwise—as well as their landscapes, financial flows, and
reputations.
For socio-legal scholars, studying the city enables us to ask questions in action, that leitmotif of
law in society work. We can focus on both processes and perspectives, understanding law as an
ongoing dynamic activity, full of compromise, negotiation, and meaning-making. Urban lawyers
can borrow from urban anthropologists who investigate modern urban life not only “in the city,”
but also “of the city.”10 The city is more than a background location for fieldwork; the urban
becomes the research question: How is urban life created, governed, and experienced? To under-
stand the city from a socio-legal perspective, we do of course need to be open to the difficulties of
being comprehensive, avoiding reduction where possible, whilst also acknowledging the need to
retain legibility. It is not a simple task to study urban law, but it is one that is both timely and
inviting.
B. Socio-Legal Studies and Methodology
Is urban law a socio-legal form of study? To answer this question, we need a working definition.
For some scholars, socio-legal studies foregrounds society. Susan Silbey, argues, for example, that
socio-legal studies require “a doubling of the social, both the subject and the method.”11 Other
formulations understand socio-legal studies as the multidisciplinary studies of law and legal insti-
tutions. Such a framing puts law at the center—not “law first” necessarily—but identifying law
and legal institutions as the subject of study, noting that “law” here can include rules, customs,
norms, and practices because socio-legal scholars rarely confine their analysis to legislation, case
law, or other formal sources. In this characterization, socio-legal studies can include doctrinal legal
analyses, understanding the legal landscape to ground other empirical research or providing a
basis from which to argue for reform.12
This broader formulation of socio-legal studies suggests that even when legal analytical meth-
ods predominate, if it is society rather than “law in books” that is under the microscope, it is the
shift of subject—from law to society—that confers socio-legal significance to the research.13 We
are altering our focus, as Carrie MenkelMeadows explains, from the formalism of jurisprudence
—“what” is law—or doctrinal studies of law—“what is” the law—to instead concerning ourselves
with “what does law do?”14 So urban socio-legal studies investigate what urban law does, how it cre-
ates urban structures, policies, and practices, which themselves contribute to spatial, social, economic,
cultural, and historical factors to produce the city itself.
10RIVKE JAFFE & ANOUK DE KONING, INTRODUCING URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY (2015).
11Susan S. Silbey,What Makes a Social Science of Law? Doubling the Social in Socio-Legal Studies, in EXPLORING THE ‘SOCIO’
OF SOCIO-LEGAL STUD. 20–36 (Dermot Feenan ed., 2013), 20.
12Sarah Blandy, Socio-legal Approaches to Property Law Research, in RESEARCHING PROPERTY L. 24–42 (Susan Bright &
Sarah Blandy eds., 2016).
13Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986); Joel F Handler, Postmodernism,
Protest, and the New Social Movements, in THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 697 (1992); David Nelken, Law in Action or Living
Law? Back to the Beginning in Sociology of Law, 4 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 157 (1984); Susan S. Silbey, Everyday Life and
the Constitution of Legality, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 332 (2007); Mariana Valverde,
“Which Side Are You On?”Uses of the Everyday in Socio-legal Scholarship, 26 POL. & L. ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 86, 86–98 (2003).
14Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Uses and abuses of socio-legal studies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND
METHODS 35–57, 39 (Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, & Kirsten McConnachie eds., 1 ed. 2019).
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I. Qualitative Research
To investigate the interaction between law and society, methodologies and methods are articulated
through a research design. Empirical socio-legal researchers use both qualitative and quantitative
methods to empirically test their theories and hypotheses. Qualitative socio-legal research is
predominantly naturalistic, ethnographic, and/or participatory, looking for evidence of mean-
ing-making. Here, methodologies draw primarily from social science and humanities research,
including, increasingly, anthropology. Many legal scholars would also argue that legal research,
insofar as it draws on legislation, case law, and policy documents, is itself empirical, being con-
cerned with observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic. Lisa Webley explains the
connection, suggesting that “[m]any common law practitioners are unaware that they undertake
qualitative empirical legal research on a regular basis—the case-based method of establishing the
law through analysis of precedent is in fact a form of qualitative research using documents as
source material.”15
We can use qualitative research, defined broadly to include doctrinal, comparative, and law-in-
context approaches, to investigate cities encompassing the many, the diverse, and the outsiders. As
Hendrik Hartog explained in Pigs and Positivism, customs, histories, people, buildings, sightlines,
and even pigs can make up a city.16 When an 1819 judgment prohibited the animals from running
freely in the streets of New York, preferring judicial reasoning to established custom, this “creation
of a modern bureaucracy, the transformation of relatively self-sufficient artisans and mechanics
into a working class, and the growth of a commercial rural agriculture dedicated to feeding urban
residents” combined to present a coherent articulation of nineteenth century urban modernity.17
For Hartog, it enabled the city to be “derived imaginatively” from the judgment prohibiting the
pigs.18 Analyzing the judgment is a form of qualitative research, making meaning from the deci-
sion to better understand urban governance, reading decisions for both their ratio and for their
absences, in this case the legal customs, everyday practices, and the perspectives of excluded par-
ticipants, in this case, the pigs.
We must, as Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos explains, be careful of our vantage
points and blind spots in urban law.19 We all experience “the city” differently, not least due
to race, gender, age, or additional needs with racism, gender vulnerability, and ableist infra-
structures often built into the fabric of cities. One famous story concerns the decision by
Robert Moses to design bridges on parkways running through Long Island to be too low to
allow regular use by buses, thereby preventing the twothirds of New Yorkers who did not have
access to a car from visiting the State’s beaches.20 In his biography of Moses, Robert Caro sug-
gests that was a conscious decision, embedding political decisions in concrete rather than rely-
ing on legal restrictions:
Mr. Moses did this because he knew that something might happen after he was dead and
gone. He wrote legislation [clauses prohibiting the use of pathways by “buses or other com-
mercial vehicles”] but he knew you could change the legislation. You can’t change a bridge
after it’s up. And the result of this is that a bus from New York couldn’t use the parkways if
we wanted it to.21
15Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH 927, 927 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
16Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 4 WIS. L. REV. 899 (1985).
17Id. at 912.
18Id. at 911–12.
19PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, supra note 8.
20See also, Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 121–36 (1980).
21ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 952 (2015).
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In this New York context, anyone lacking access to a car could not rely on buses to use the
roads. The rules permitting Moses to determine the height of bridges despite their discriminatory
effect, provided a physical legacy still felt today, illustrating how rules can be built into the urban
infrastructure itself. Pouring Moses’ decision-making into concrete made the prejudiced assump-
tions about who should leave the city to visit the beach both spatially difficult and expensive to
alter. Similarly, the protection of statues of men involved in slavery or oppression by heritage
bodies has caused huge pain and unhappiness to urban residents, prompting extra-legal responses
to administrative procedures of officials.22 By recognizing these interrelationships, using qualita-
tive research methods including close reading of texts, interviews, participant observations, and site
visits, socio-legal scholars can investigate urban law as an ongoing dynamic activity—identifying how
legal provisions, practices, customs, bridges, statues or pigs order the city.
II. Quantitative Research
Legal quantitative research does not differ significantly from quantitative research in other dis-
ciplines. Socio-legal scholars still design their projects, collect and code data, conduct analyses, and
present results. The biggest difficulty in empirical legal research, as Andrew Epstein and Lee
Martin suggest, is a lack of statistical understanding in their readership, communicating “complex
statistical results to a community lacking in statistical training.”23 As with qualitative research,
quantitative analyses can be exploratory, explanatory, and/or descriptive. Socio-legal scholars
can add to this sustained interrogation of categories, which is premised on legal definitions that
underpin the data.
One area where legal definitions and quantitative assessments interact is in indicators, an
increasingly hot topic in comparative law, with possible implications for urban law. An indicator
has been defined as “a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or
projected performance of different units.”24 The critical aspect here is that the data are “generated
through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon” and are, “in this
simplified and processed form, : : : capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis
(such as countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or over time, and to evaluate
their performance by reference to one or more standards.”25
Exploring the genealogy of indicators, investigating how individual criteria have developed, by
whom and for what purpose, has led Sally Merry to identify their “seductive qualities.”26 She raises
the alarm, writing that indicators, “particularly those that rely on ranks or numbers, convey an
aura of objective truth and facilitate comparisons” even while they “typically conceal their political
and theoretical origins and underlying theories of social change and activism : : : [relying] on
practices of measurement and counting that are them-selves opaque.”27 Scoring progress against
indicators encourages partial compliance—and even cheating or changing definitions and assess-
ments of whether compliance has been achieved.28 Scholars are critical of how indicators function
22Briana Millett, Historic England has say on future of Edward Colston statue, BRISTOL POST (June 8, 2020), https://www.
bristolpost.co.uk/news/bristol-news/historic-england-edward-colston-statue-4203119 (last visited Jun 8, 2020).
23Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Quantitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH, 902 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
24Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 71, 73–74 (2012).
25Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Introduction: The Local-Global Life of Indicators: Law, Power,
and Resistance, in THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS 4 (Sally Engle Merry, Kevin E. Davis & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2015).
26SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX
TRAFFICKING (2016).
27Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance: With CA Comment by John
M. Conley, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83, S84 (2011).
28Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Prepare Your Indicators: Economics Imperialism on the Shores of Law and Development, 7 INT’L
J.L. CONTEXT 401, 410 (2011).
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as a technology of governance, noting their “deep managerial roots,” with Amanda Perry-Kassaris’
video providing an excellent representation of how indicators narrow down the view—translating
something into a definition to be counted, relying on a particular form of recognizability—which
may not translate into all contexts and cultures.29 Indicators are both a form of knowledge pro-
duction and a technique of governance, producing both co-option and resistance.30
And yet, despite all of these critiques, indicators are likely to continue in policy evaluations.
They provide a method to attempt to achieve equivalence, critical to any form of comparative
urban assessment. By understanding quantitative data analysis, the legal formulations that under-
pin categorizations, and the critiques of numeric reduction, socio-legal scholars can contribute to
these debates, explaining how legal and numeric taxonomies interact at the urban scale.
III. Urban Law: A Grammar
As analysts, in any discipline, we need some way to make cities legally legible, we cannot see the
city in its legal totality, at a scale of 1:1. This frustration was famously captured by Luis Borges and
Adolfo Bioy Casares’ one-paragraph story, On Exactitude in Science, where the Guild of
Cartographers “struck up a map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which
coincided point for point with it.”31 To map on a scale of 1:1, the cartographers had to create
a map as big as the space they were mapping, and in their case, the Empire. To map the urban
on a scale of 1:1, we would have to create a city.
This necessity for analytical reduction is not only a problem for lawyers. Algebraic equations
make the world readable to scientists, modern economics rests on a central tenet that profit and
loss can be calculated—there are many mechanisms of legibility. If urban law aims to understand
cities, then we need some mechanism of reduction, a form of intellectual infrastructure, to inves-
tigate how cities govern and are governed by people, places, reputations, and things. We cannot
study the city in all its complexity.
So how do we reduce the city to be studied in urban law? One starting point is to attempt to
identify the grammar of urban governance by identifying the key legal frameworks, the laws, cases,
policy documents, practices, and legal cultures that govern cities—including local government
arrangements, economic development, housing, transportation, public and community spaces,
the community as a whole, criminal law and criminology, and infrastructure. We then use the
socio-legal scholar’s toolkit: Theory, qualitative, quantitative, and/or doctrinal legal analysis to
understand how cities are produced by, and produce, law. Socio-legal research investigates
how law constitutes everyday social relations, in this case, in an urban setting. This includes a
focus on administrative rationality, asking how a city sees as well as investigating how the city
is produced, from the ground up.32 Quantitative data sets, including indicators, might be useful
here—noting their limitations—particularly when paired with legal analyses. Although
undoubtedly costly, urban law research can draw on multiple methods, engaging reflexively to
interrogate and strengthen initial theories, questions, and findings.33
The aim is to understand how cities are legally produced with an eye to identifying shared legal
concepts, regulatory approaches and practices, as well as notable differences. We can adopt the
insight, if not the full critique, of Jennifer Robinson, that most urban areas are “ordinary cities,”
29Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Socio-legal model making 3: Conceptualisation (2016), https://vimeo.com/185963121 (last visited
May 15, 2020).
30Morag Goodwin, The Poverty of Numbers: Reflections on the Legitimacy of Global Development Indicators, 13 INT’L J.L.
CONTEXT 485, 486 (2017).
31JORGE LUIS BORGES, COLLECTED FICTIONS 325 (1999).
32Mariana Valverde, Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban Governance:
Seeing Like a City, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 277 (2011).
33See Laura Beth Nielsen, The Need for Multi-Method Approaches in Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
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addressing similar problems—unaffordable housing, transport congestion, and air pollution—
using analogous governance frameworks. Research has often prioritized capital and mega-
cities—such as London, Paris, Shanghai, or New York—yet we need to study cities regardless
of their size. An ordinary city approach avoids hierarchy, privileging the “mega-cities,” “global
cities” or the metropolis over other cities and can help bridge geographical and epistemological
divides, and broadens the number of cities understood as legal governance systems.34 As Belgian
Geographer Nick Schuermans reviewing Robinson’s book notes, challenging the hierarchical pro-
duction of urban theory:
Very rarely, a scholar from the Anglo-Saxon heartland would be expected to cite a Belgian
case study for the sake of the originality of the theory, and not just to embellish his list of
references with a publication from an exotic country imitating and confirming the theories
produced in London, Los Angeles or New York.35
To truly understand the urban everyday, we need to understand “ordinary” as well as “mega” or
“global” cities—assessing both the differences and similarities between them, and producing legal
legibility for analysis.
C. Why “Urban”?
For lawyers, the urban area can fall into administrative boundaries, drawing a line beyond which a
city government’s formal jurisdiction on local affairs does not run. One risk with this bounded
approach is that it can transform urban law into local government or localized administrative law
—raising the argument that we should no more study cities than rural administrative areas. A
related concern is that focusing too much on city boundaries can also prioritize the rights, duties,
and interests of city government—downplaying the significance of land ownership, private capital
flows, ecosystems or movements by people, vehicles or pollutants. More fundamentally, a focus on
local government boundaries misses the quality of urbanism as a way of life.
Such questions are not limited to urban law. One of the most perplexing questions for all urban
scholars—be they in anthropology, sociology, politics, history, or geography—is why we would
distinguish cities from other forms of human settlement. Should we have a specifically urban focus
of analysis? What, if anything, is distinctive about cities or urban places?
Summarizing this critique in the 1980s, DoreenMassey explained that “[e]stablished theory has
on the whole rested content with a rather unthought-out position that there is something called
‘the urban,’ that urban phenomena can be treated as independent variables.”36 This led some geog-
raphers to shift their interests, focusing on networks, mobilities, and global capitalist relations,
aiming to understand cities as part of broader economic, spatial, and social processes.37
Marxist geographers raised questions about whether cities are better understood as facilitating
capitalism, creating a class of workers to service wealth production, or embedding cities within
broader economic and political relations.38 David Harvey, investigating how capital and urban
34JENNIFER ROBINSON, ORDINARY CITIES: BETWEEN MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT (2013); SASKIA SASSEN, SOCIOLOGY OF
GLOBALIZATION (2007); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2013); Nick Schuermans,
J. Robinson, Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development. 4, 5 (2009).
35NICK SCHUERMANS, J. ROBINSON, ORDINARY CITIES: BETWEEN MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 4 (2009).
36Doreen Massey, The Urban Land Nexus and the State, London: Pion. (Book Review 1980).
37See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE URBAN QUESTION: A MARXIST APPROACH (1977); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY
AND THE GRASSROOTS: A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY OF URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1983); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF
THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2000); JOHN ALLEN ET AL., RETHINKING




processes interact and what they spatially produce, concluded that capital accumulation takes
place within geographical context, producing specific kinds of geographical structures, including
cities.39 Henri Lefebvre suggested that urbanization processes create the conditions for capitalism,
underpinning his claim that “society has been completely urbanized.”40 For scholars studying the
urban effects of empire, relationality proves significant. Colonial cities should not be understood
as a particular category of city, explains Anthony King, but rather as the interaction of distinct
elements, including national society, territory, and location, as well as the particular process of
colonization experienced.41 This critique recognises that urbanism is also a process, challenging
a conception of “the urban” as just a type of place.
There are also geographic boundary criticisms. Where does the city end and the rural start?
How should we understand the causes and effects of urban expansion, decentralization, and sub-
urbanization? Roger Keil has argued that urbanization today “is mainly suburbanization in its
manifold differentiation” with the “form and life of the global suburb” taking “shape in a general
dynamic of multiple centralities and decentralities.”42 Infrastructure is networked, often—though
not always in a “modern infrastructural ideal”—patterning urban and suburban areas in way we
often take for granted outside of rural settlements, where fuel supplies, broadband connections,
and sanitation connections may be missing.43 Given these networked infrastructures, can we effec-
tively draw lines around a city boundary?
A further challenge is to identify the best scale for research, with researchers often finding that
urban inequality occurs in neighborhoods, rather than in cities as a whole. Scholars identify hous-
ing choices and residential mobility as having the capacity to improve neighborhood deprivation
at the neighborhood scale.44 They examine experiences of structural racism, high rates of poverty,
and social isolation in communities suffering from poor infrastructure, job opportunities, and
reputational stigma.45 Economic geographers, in particular, investigate urban difference at a
granular level to try to understand whether living or growing up in certain neighborhoods affects
life chances—even when they are embedded in broader national, regional or city-wide processes
such as recessions, de-industrialization, or local government austerity.46 Scholars researching one
Swedish neighborhood found that “individuals who lived with their parents in a poverty concen-
tration neighborhood, experience negative effects on their income later in life, even seventeen
years after they have left their parental home.”47 Although there is much more that needs to
be understood here, research so far indicates that housing tenure and social welfare programs
39See David Harvey, The Geography of Capitalist Accumulation: A Reconstruction of the Marxian Theory*, 7 ANTIPODE 9
(1975); DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2006); DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY
TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION (2012).
40HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE URBAN REVOLUTION (2003), 1.
41See ANTHONY D. KING, URBANISM, COLONIALISM, AND THE WORLD-ECONOMY (2015).
42Roger Keil, Extended urbanization, “disjunct fragments” and global suburbanisms, 36 ENVIRON PLAN D 494–511, 494
(2018).
43Olivier Coutard, Placing Splintering Urbanism: Introduction, 39 GEOFORUM 1815, 1815–20 (2008); STEVE GRAHAM &
SIMON MARVIN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE CITY: ELECTRONIC SPACES, URBAN PLACES (2002); STEVE GRAHAM &
SIMON MARVIN, SPLINTERING URBANISM: NETWORKED INFRASTRUCTURES, TECHNOLOGICAL MOBILITIES AND THE URBAN
CONDITION (2002).
44WENDA DOFF, PUZZLING NEIGHBOURHOOD EFFECTS: SPATIAL SELECTION, ETHNIC CONCENTRATION AND
NEIGHBOURHOOD IMPACTS (2010).
45WILLIAM JULIUSWILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, SECOND
EDITION (2012).
46JÜRGEN FRIEDRICHS, GEORGE GALSTER & SAKO MUSTERD, LIFE IN POVERTY NEIGHBOURHOODS: EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (2013); DAVID MANLEY ET AL., NEIGHBOURHOOD EFFECTS OR NEIGHBOURHOOD BASED
PROBLEMS?: A POLICY CONTEXT (2013).
47Lina Hedman et al., Cumulative Exposure to Disadvantage and the Intergenerational Transmission of Neighbourhood
Effects, 15 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 195, 207 (2015).
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appear to improve neighborhood outcomes, providing more equitable life chances for children
growing up in deprived urban areas.48
Despite these findings, legal rules and practices are rarely implemented at a neighborhood
scale, with these effects continuing to be poorly understood, despite studies of “the divided city.”49
Neighborhoods have been studied in the context of planning and ideologies of localism, or as
relationships between neighbors.50 Scholars have addressed legal questions at a micro-scale,
particularly on the street or sidewalk, investigating how such interactions are produced and
managed51, and these are important contributions to understanding how urban flows are regu-
lated by people, objects, rules, and practices. However, just as urban studies cannot ignore neigh-
borhood effects on health, wealth or participation, neither can urban law. We need city,
neighborhood, and street-scale analyses to combine if we are to understand urban legal dynamics.
The task is to use the granular findings from streets and neighborhoods to inform a broader
understanding of urban law, even if this widens out our understanding of “the urban”.
Yet another critique of urban law is that governance arrangements vary, with many cities
having only limited jurisdictional scope. Not all can determine economic policies, make their
own transportation improvements, or cap rents. Sometimes responsibility rests with regional gov-
ernance, as with German Länder. At other times, as in the United Kingdom, centralized govern-
ments make the most fundamental urban decisions, limiting local tax raising powers, controlling
local budgets, and mandating rental laws and employment frameworks. Different histories
embodying the legacies of the Hanseatic League or Italian city states have emerged into distinctive
jurisdictional arrangements.52 The task of urban law must acknowledge the variabilities of con-
stitutional law, identifying the powers of cities. Having set out the local government framework,
urban law must then go beyond it, explaining how cities operate in both law and policy in the gaps
that are left—or in the governance fields cities claim, depending on the jurisdiction. Such analyses
can draw work in international law where scholars consider the scale of human rights—investigating
their possibility at the citylevel, questioning the value of legalizing urban citizenship, and analyzing
the effects of framing places as sanctuary cities.53
A broader riposte still to urban law is to ask whether—even if we study deprivation, pollution,
and poor housing quality in cities—we should neglect economic, welfare, or environmental law
outside urban and spatial boundaries. Is housing law not the same inside and outside of cities?
Even if we argue that some policy problems accumulate in certain places, that air quality is worse
in urban areas and high demand can exacerbate poor quality housing, this is not necessarily an
argument for urban law per se.
48FRIEDRICHS, GALSTER & MUSTERD, supra note 46.
49SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN, IAN GORDON & MICHAEL HARLOE, DIVIDED CITIES: NEW YORK & LONDON IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD (1992); ALAN MALLACH, THE DIVIDED CITY: POVERTY AND PROSPERITY IN URBAN AMERICA (2018); CARL H.
NIGHTINGALE, SEGREGATION: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF DIVIDED CITIES (2012).
50See Alexandra Elizabeth Flynn, Re-Imagining Local Governance: The Landscape of “Local” in Toronto, OSGOODE DIGITAL
COMMONS: PHD DISSERTATIONS (2017), https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/phd/35; Alexandra Flynn & Zachary
Spicer, Re-Imagining Community Councils in Canadian Local Government (2017); Alexandra Flynn & Mariana Valverde,
Planning on the Waterfront: Setting the Agenda for Toronto’s ‘Smart City’ Project, 20 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 769, 769–75
(2019); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (2009).
51NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: SIDEWALKS AND THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC FLOW (2010); Rodrigo Meneses-
Reyes, Out of Place, Still in Motion: Shaping (Im)Mobility Through Urban Regulation, 22 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 335 (2013);
Padmapriya Vidhya-Govindarajan, Who Owns the Sidewalk?: Analysing Spatial Reorganization Amidst Regulation
and Hierarchies in the Pondy Bazaar Street Market, Chennai, India, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN LAW 114
(Nestor M. Davidson & Geeta Tewari eds., 2018).
52SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2008).
53Aust Helmut Philipp, Urban Citizenship – a Status or a Practice?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (JAN. 29, 2020), https://verfassungs-
blog.de/urban-citizenship-a-status-or-a-practice/; Harald Bauder & Dayana A. Gonzalez, Municipal Responses to ‘Illegality’:
Urban Sanctuary across National Contexts, 6 SOC. INCLUSION 124 (2018).
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The imperfect answer to all of these criticisms is that they undoubtedly hold a kernel of truth,
and yet we should still act. Half of humanity, 3.5 billion people, live in cities,54 many in quite
terrible personal circumstances, produced by a lack of regulatory oversight of housing quality,
pollution control, or planned economic development. Urban law gives us a rare opportunity
to engage holistically, investigating how laws interact in time and space from the ground up.
We cannot capture every urban aspect. Instead, urban lawyers attempt to study cities from the
inside, trying to commit to paper how the city operates around us and how legal rules on local
government, finance, transportation, education, sustainability, housing, policing, and protesting
—to name just a few—operate at the same time.
D. Why Urban “Law”?
Taking all these difficulties and limitations on board, we can identify three further sets of reasons
to develop urban law as a field of study: The first is the subject’s potential to contribute to vibrant
interdisciplinary research; the second is to put law in service of improved urban quality; the third
is to further develop legal concepts and understandings of interest to lawyers including gover-
nance, territory, jurisdiction, sovereignty, networks, and money.
I. Urbanism
The first argument for urban law is perhaps the most compelling—urbanism is interesting. In
1973, New York urban lawyer Frank Grad suggested that then, in a period of urban decline, one
contributing factor to the relative lack of urban law scholarship rested on “the many so-called
urbanists who either hate the city or have given up on it.”55 Today, cities and urban living are
back in vogue, providing a growing focus for interdisciplinary research. Cities attract socio-
legal scholars, the intellectual descendants of Ehrlich’s study of “living law,” keen to study
urban rules and practices in urban sites that are still, to some extent, living laboratories—
to use the language of 1930s Chicago sociology. Anthropological and sociological methodol-
ogies and methods, particularly ethnography, interviews, and observations, provide valuable
ways for scholars interested in urban law to gather data to better understand the legal produc-
tion of the city, even if at the moment much of this research is undertaken by scholars with
their initial training outside of law.56
And so, despite the vibrant discourse of urban studies, legally-focused scholarship is, with
notable exceptions, mostly absent.57 Nonetheless, lawyers have much to contribute here, asking
54UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 1.
55Frank P. Grad, The City is Here to Stay, URB. L. ANN. 3, 3 (1973).
56NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY: URBAN LAND AND THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY (2004); Mariana Valverde,
Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of Seeing in Urban Governance, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 277
(2011); INSA LEE KOCH, PERSONALIZING THE STATE: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW, POLITICS, AND WELFARE IN AUSTERITY
BRITAIN (2018).
57Phil Hubbard, Kissing is Not a Universal Right: Sexuality, Law and the Scales of Citizenship, 49 GEOFORUM 224 (2013);
Phil Hubbard & Rachela Colosi, Sex, Crime and the City: Municipal Law and the Regulation of Sexual Entertainment, 22 SOC.
& LEGAL STUD. 67 (2013); Jason Prior, Spike Boydell & Philip Hubbard, Nocturnal Rights to the City: Property, Propriety and
Sex Premises in Inner Sydney, 49 URB. STUD. 1837 (2012); Nicholas Blomley, How to Turn a Beggar into a Bus Stop: Law,
Traffic and the “Function of the Place”, 44 URB. STUD. 1697 (2007); Anna Barker et al., Everyday Encounters with Difference in
Urban Parks: Forging ‘Openness to Otherness’ in Segmenting Cities, 15 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 495 (2019); John MacDonald et al.,
The Privatization of Public Safety in Urban Neighborhoods: Do Business Improvement Districts Reduce Violent Crime Among
Adolescents?, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 621 (2013); Mariana Valverde, Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern
Ways of Seeing in Urban Governance: Seeing Like a City, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 277 (2011); Mariana Valverde, Authorizing the
Production of Urban Moral Order: Appellate Courts and Their Knowledge Games, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2005); Ann Varley,
Modest Expectations: Gender and Property Rights in Urban Mexico, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 67 (2010).
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about the significance of property, feeding into debates about urban land acquisition,58 protest and
free expression, policing and urban criminology, and cultural practices—complementing socio-
logical focus not only on people in cities but also people in urban law and society.
Certainly, the ideal type of the European city, so influenced by Weber and his Die Stadt with
its emphasis on urban associations, cannot provide a single template for urban law. Weber’s
“Politico-Administrative concept of the City”59 undoubtedly informs urban life in some coun-
tries but cannot encapsulate all cities in their entirety. In particular, as Weber himself noted,
urbanism as a form of consciousness is distinct from its physical embodiment. Contrasting
these as the cité and the ville, Richard Sennett identifies the cité as representing “the character
of life in a neighborhood,” its anthropology and a “kind of consciousness,” while ville encom-
passes the built environment—both buildings and “the product of the maker’s will.”60 These
two conceptions can be bridged, Sennett argues, if the urbanist is a partner to the urbanite,
being both critical and self-critical.61 Similarly, for urban lawyer and theorist Andreas
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, there is far more to cities than built environment alone, remain-
ing in pursuit of careful critical analysis which produces “the ideal conversion from urbs to
civitas.”62 Fordham’s Nestor Davidson and Nisha Mistry also point to the broader possibilities
for urban law, borrowing from Jan Gehl’s 1973 Life Between Buildings, to call for “Law Between
Buildings,” providing a careful investigation of cities beyond their physical form.63 With par-
ticipatory governance a conventional way to understand the cité, and planning, building and
infrastructure regulations conventional ways to understand the ville, urban lawyers can bring
their appreciation for how these regimes interact, by producing, for example, opportunities for
local residents to object to contentious development applications, even if they are not
always heard.
Urban studies can also be enriched through analysis of repeated techniques used in urban law,
fitting into modern debates framed as “planetary urbanism”, drawing on the broader question
about what is distinctive about “the urban”, whether there is an “outside” to urbanity.64 This line
of scholarship, developed by Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid, builds on Henri Lefebvre’s argu-
ment from the 1960s that, given the extension of networks both human, technological and finan-
cial, we are, in effect, “all urban now”.65 These arguments are highly theorized and polarized,
highlighting urbanization as a process, prioritizing dynamics in terms of explanatory power, pre-
ferring to understand “urban” as a verb rather than as a noun.66 Theories of planetary urbanism
have been criticized for “occluding” central aspects of urban studies, including difference, central-
ity, and the everyday, as well as privileging particular epistemologies.67 Arguing for progressive
urban change, Clive Barnett and Susan Parnell have noted that while planetary urbanism provides
space for aspects of Southern urban realities, it does not provide much assistance in thinking
58ALLEN J. SCOTT, THE URBAN LAND NEXUS AND THE STATE (2013); Allen J. Scott & Michael Storper, The Nature of Cities:
The Scope and Limits of Urban Theory, 39 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 1 (2015).
59Max Weber, The Nature of the City, in RICHARD SENNETT, CLASSIC ESSAYS ON THE CULTURE OF CITIES (1969).
60RICHARD SENNETT, BUILDING AND DWELLING: ETHICS FOR THE CITY 1–2 (2018).
61Id. at 16.
62PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS, supra note 8, at 7.
63See NESTOR DAVIDSON & NISHA MISTRY, LAW BETWEEN BUILDINGS: EMERGENT GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN LAW
(2016).
64HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE URBAN REVOLUTION (Robert Bononno tran., 2003); PLANETARY URBANIZATION: AN URBAN
THEORY FOR OUR TIME?., (Neil Brenner & Christian Schmid eds.,); NEIL BRENNER, IMPLOSIONS/EXPLOSIONS: TOWARDS A
STUDY OF PLANETARY URBANIZATION (2014); Christian Schmid, Journeys through planetary urbanization: Decentering per-
spectives on the urban, 36 ENVIRON PLAN D 591–610 (2018).
65Id.
66NEIL BRENNER, IMPLOSIONS/EXPLOSIONS: TOWARDS A STUDY OF PLANETARY URBANIZATION (2014).
67Sue Ruddick et al., Planetary Urbanization: An Urban Theory for Our Time?, 36 ENVTL. PLAN. 387 (2018).
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concretely about how local city governments can find opportunities about how city-based actors
can be supported “to expand their influence and agency relative to national and international
actors such as firms, political parties or governments.”68
And yet while there may be limits to the planetary urbanism thesis, the focus on repetition
within debates on planetary urbanism provides space for lawyers to demonstrate how repeated
practices—sometimes by global commercial players using familiar techniques of property man-
agement and urban renewal—can replicate across jurisdictions.69 In Urban Warfare: Housing
Under the Empire of Finance, Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Raquel Rolnik argues
that the financialization of housing since 2008 has been disastrous for many left homeless and
dispossessed.70 Rolnik points to familiar legal techniques, often resting on property commodifi-
cation, including home ownership, sub-prime mortgages, and the right to buy, arguing that these
legally facilitated transactions enable global urban wealth to be concentrated disproportionately in
the hands of a few. Many cities have been affected by the same legal techniques, conceptually
similar, if tweaked by jurisdiction.
Similarly, repeated practices have characterized urban retail development. Legal and spatial
enclosures of previously public spaces, “malls without walls,” are often based on repeated proto-
types, particularly using long leases from public authorities to private developers for 250 years—
whilst maintaining on websites or public documents that the city still owns the land, which of
course it does in terms of the freehold estate, though this is a long-postponed interest in reversion.
The standard pattern is to masterplan a neglected urban area, using public powers of compulsory
purchase and highway adaptation to subdue unruly landscapes into economically productive sites
of consumption, governed by standard leases networks of experience.71
Transportation is also subject to repeated moves, including the designation of express
or motorways, governed often at a national or regional scale, used by individual and corporate
drivers.72 Automobility is a cultural, economic, and political practice, which, all around the
world is “the predominant global form of ‘quasi-private’ mobility that subordinates other
mobilities of walking, cycling, travelling by rail and so on, and reorganizes how people nego-
tiate the opportunities for, and constraints upon, work, family life, childhood, leisure and
pleasure.”73 Observing these repeated patterns and practices provides legal scholars opportu-
nities to investigate transfers of both progressive and regressive urban practices. More funda-
mentally, by exposing the legal basis for these practices, urban lawyers can ask whether these
repetitions are urban in their conception or in their effect. Urban lawyers have real scope to
contribute to broader debates on whether “the urban” is a place or a process, engaging
with debates in “planetary urbanism” or “planetary gentrification” explaining how we can
often see the same techniques used again and again. It is in picking up these repeated legal
forms—as well as noting progressive good practice or cultural distinctions—that urban law
can develop in its own right as well as contributing to comparative legal development and
urban studies.
68Clive Barnett & Susan Parnell, Ideas, Implementation and Indicators: Epistemologies of the Post-2015 Urban Agenda, 28
ENV’T & URBANIZATION 87, 87 (2016).
69See LORETTA LEES, HYUN BANG SHIN & ERNESTO LÓPEZ-MORALES, PLANETARY GENTRIFICATION (2016); Antonia Layard,
Property and Planning Law in England: Facilitating and Countering Gentrification, in HANDBOOK OF GENTRIFICATION
STUDIES (2018).
70RAQUEL ROLNIK, URBAN WARFARE: HOUSING UNDER THE EMPIRE OF FINANCE (Gabriel Hirschhorn trans., 2019)
71Antonia Layard, Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 412 (2010).
72See generally John Urry, The ‘System’ of Automobility, 21 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 25 (2004); JIM CONLEY, CAR
TROUBLES: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AUTOMOBILITY AND AUTO-MOBILITY (2016); NICHOLAS LOW, TRANSFORMING URBAN
TRANSPORT: FROM AUTOMOBILITY TO SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT (2012); SUDHIR CHELLA RAJAN, THE ENIGMA OF
AUTOMOBILITY: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND POLLUTION CONTROL (1996).
73Urry, supra note 72, at 26.
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II. Law in Service of Urban Quality
The United Nations couch their call for policy engagement by extrapolating from current trends,
in that “the future will be urban for a majority of people, the solutions to some of the greatest
issues facing humans—poverty, climate change, healthcare, education—must be found in city
life.”74 The city provides a test case for policy questions, while “sustainable urbanism” becomes
a policy rubric to address shared problems of infrastructure, housing, economic development, and
environmental adequacy. This is a pragmatic—if sometimes contested— strategy. For while sus-
tainable development has long been understood as a contested subject, modern formulations,
beginning with the Millennium Goals, have reduced complexity—compared to Agenda 21’s
351 pages—fitting objectives onto a single page, using simplicity to raise public awareness, facili-
tating mobilization, advocacy, and continuity.75
Law and legal practice are clearly relevant to this progressive task. The “New Urban Agenda”
was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development
(Habitat III) in Quito, Ecuador in 2016 and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly
later that year.76 It presents a “shared vision,” promoting the agenda as “a powerful tool for sus-
tainable development for both developing and developed countries.”77 The Agenda incorporates
the newly developed Sustainable Development Goal 11, which proclaims that we should make
“cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.”78 Such policy activity
is increasingly coupled with rising interest in behavioral economics or “nudge theory” in policy
and decision-making circles, encouraging scholars to contribute understanding of “the human
dimension” in more accessible forms.79 Any legal contributions come, of course, with an acknowl-
edgement of disciplinary normativity, explicitly acknowledging urban aims to build better,
cleaner, and more equitable cities. It requires urban law scholars explicitly to lay bare their intel-
lectual foundations, which is an unfamiliar scholarly move.
Socio-legal studies are primarily concerned with the “how,” investigating the ways in which law
and society, people and rules, customs and practices, objects and places, interact and inter-relate.
Of course, it will always be critically important to separate the research from policy prescriptions.
Nonetheless, urban law has potential not only to understand the “how” but also to inform the
“how to.” Socio-legal studies have seen increasing numbers of self-identified “scholar activists”
at a time where politicians have sometimes claimed that “people have had enough of experts”
or where identifying a point as “academic” consigns it to the sidelines of debate.80 M. V. Lee
Badgett, writing in The Public Professor: How to Use Your Research to Change the World, calls
on scholars to engage with problems of climate change, social and economic inequality, war, vio-
lence, threats to democracy, and infrastructure meltdowns. He argues that while “it’s tempting to
keep our heads in books and computers, hoping that our students and published ideas will trickle
down from the ivory tower into the world to make a difference,” this rarely happens.81 Indeed,
Badgett believes that “giving into this temptation would be a lost opportunity and an abdication of
our social responsibility.”82 Martin Partington agrees, particularly given the growing preference
74UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 1.
75Jeffrey Sachs, From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals, 379 LANCET 2206, 2210 (2012).
76UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON HOUSING AND SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HABITAT III), New Urban
Agenda, (Oct. 20, 2016).
77Id. at iv.
78Id. at 4.
79Noel Castree et al., Changing the Intellectual Climate, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 763, 763–68 (2014).
80Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove, FINANCIAL TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-
abc22d5d108c (last visited May 13, 2020); Michael Gove on the Trouble With Experts, CHATHAM HOUSE (March 3, 2017),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/michael-gove-trouble-experts (last visited May 13, 2020).
81M.V. LEE BADGETT, THE PUBLIC PROFESSOR: HOW TO USE YOUR RESEARCH TO CHANGE THE WORLD 15–16 (2016).
82Id.
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for “evidence-based” policy-making, noting drily that evidence-based policymaking is always
“likely to be better than policy-making shaped by anecdote or personal preference.”83
Of course, taking a normative position, being “pro-urban,” is not a neutral step. It is important
to be explicit about it, separating “research” from “policy implementation” to the greatest extent
possible. Given socio-legal academics’ substantial—if sometimes imperfect—academic freedom
all research starts from a subjective viewpoint. It is increasingly important to acknowledge
researcher positionality within socio-legal studies. Urban law is no different in this respect.
In the absence of formal treaties or legislation focusing on urban law, charters and indicators
provide one way to engage in detailed legal scrutiny of explicitly pro-urban agendas, using well-
established doctrinal skills. The 1996 Habitat II Charter, agreed to in Istanbul, had already called
for legal implementation of urban objectives, including through “national laws and development
priorities, programs and policies,” as “the sovereign right and responsibility of each State in con-
formity with all human rights and fundamental freedoms [ : : : ] to achieve the objectives of
adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements development.”84 Such definitions pro-
vide lawyers with opportunities to track language and meanings, noting how rhetorically attractive
declarations can shift objectives over time.
In housing, Habitat II already emphasized the importance of legal rights to security of tenure in
1996 when it called for states to provide “legal security of tenure and equal access to land to all
people, including women and those living in poverty.”85 Nevertheless, by 2016, the Habitat III
Quito Declaration on Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements for All, security of tenure, such
a key legal concept, was only to be “promoted”.86 Paragraph 13, rather than confirming the sig-
nificance of secure tenure, “envisage[s] cities and human settlements that: Fulfil their social func-
tion, including the social and ecological function of land, with a view to progressively achieving the
full realization of the right to adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate stan-
dard of living, without discrimination.”87 The understanding of hard and soft law, policy, and the
limits of rights legislation by lawyers, is critical to understand what States have signed up to.
Such linguistic and legal limits to international declarations have long been understood. Their
limitations provide one reason why modern global urban policymaking has turned to targets and
indices to encourage progress. Sustainable Development Goal 11 “to make cities and human set-
tlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable” has been crafted in ostensibly quantitative form,
with four priority targets and accompanying indices.88 The four targets are to: (i) Improve housing
and upgrade slums; (ii) reduce harm to people and economic losses from disasters; (iii) reduce the
adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, particularly from air quality and waste man-
agement; and (iv) substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and
implementing integrated policies and plans.89 The SDG housing target 11.1 assesses whether
States can “[b]y 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic
services and upgrade slums,” with an indicator measuring the “proportion of urban population
living in slums, informal settlements or inadequate housing.”90
83Martin Partington, Empirical Legal Research and Policy-Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH 1004 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
84UNITED NATIONS, Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (HABITAT II), 17 (1996).
85Id.
86United Nations, New Urban Agenda: Quito Declaration on Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements for All 35 and 109
(2016).
87Id.
88Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, (2017), https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/ (last visited May 15, 2020) [hereinafter SDG
Indicators].
89Id.
90SDG Indicators, supra note 88 (Target 11.1).
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As Sally Merry et al. have explained in their explorations of the genealogies of indicators, cat-
egorizations are deductive, raising democratic questions of who assesses, what is measured, and
why.91 One task for legal scholars is to engage with the definitions that underpin these targets and
indicators in meaningful ways. Clearly, definitions of a “slum” or a “plan” can vary considerably92
so that even if slums and plans can be counted, they may not all be equivalents, with the potential
that some quite shocking urban housing conditions could be ignored. A definition of a “slum”
matters, particularly when listing the proportion of a country’s urban population living in slums93:
any number is not absolute, instead it provides a perspective of what a “slum” is and how it can be
counted. Theoretical and political objections remain to using reductive quantified assessments of
this type that may miss important lived realities, while data tables and visualizations are only as
reliable as the information entered into the software. Focusing on SDG 11, and indicator 11.1
specifically, the United Nations itself acknowledges the difficulties in differentiating between slum
and non-slum areas, suggesting that, “methodologically, such an approach would start with inno-
vative digital-based satellite imagery analysis, coupled with community ground-truthing and local
observation, and participatory slum mapping.”94
Ultimately, lawyers can make their own decisions as to whether or not to engage with these
debates. Sally Merry has encouraged scholars to think about how to make indicators better, avoid-
ing the overgeneralization, over-homogenization, and lack of context that so often limit the devel-
opment and application of indicators.95 Arguing that numbers can give us important knowledge,
she exhorts policymakers to get more complicated and nuanced information into the process,
particularly by drawing on categories of knowledge and information from the people themselves.96
Socio-legal research is particularly well-suited to contributing to this task, drawing both on under-
standing of legal and official policy formulations as well as conducting empirical investigations
into everyday meanings and understandings of key terms.
We should, then, be sensitive to the limits of quantitative analysis, slow to suggest that a par-
ticular legal framework can definitively improve a given variable, be that economic growth or
urban quality. Some legal concepts have already indicated their potential in urban law. The best
known, perhaps, is the “right to the city,” formulated both in political geography and in legal form,
primarily rhetorical but sometimes also a legal right.97 Activists and scholars have used the con-
cept of a right to formulate a deontological response to problems of urban insecurity as well as
challenging growing private control of public functions and spaces. Similarly, the legal concept of
security of tenure is understood to promote housing safety, linked to wellbeing at the neighbor-
hood scale.98 One question here is whether equivalent—and this is the key test—framings of secu-
rity of tenure can reduce populations living in urban housing insecurity. A German lease differs
significantly from an English lease in terms of renter protection, yet security of tenure can be
91SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX
TRAFFICKING (2016), http://www.bibliovault.org/BV.landing.epl?ISBN=9780226261287 (last visited May 11, 2020).; SALLY
ENGLE MERRY, KEVIN E. DAVIS & BENEDICT KINGSBURY, THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE,
CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF LAW (2015); KEVIN DAVIS ET AL., GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH
CLASSIFICATION AND RANKINGS (2012).
92NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & GEETA TEWARI, LAW AND THE NEW URBAN AGENDA (2020).
93Id. (Indicator 11.1.1).
94United Nations, Tackling Progress Towards Inclusive, Safe, Resilient and Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements: SDG
11 Synthesis Report, High Level Political Forum 2018, 44 (2018).
95Sally Merry, How to Make Global Indicators Better, YOUTUBE, 2016, =https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68gTttIn2xM
(last visited May 15, 2020).
96Id.
97See Edésio Fernandes, Constructing the ‘Right to the City’ in Brazil, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 201 (2007); Edésio Fernandes,
The “Right to the City” as a Legal Right: Lessons from Latin America 2; Abigail Friendly, The Right to the City: Theory and
Practice in Brazil, 14 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 158 (2013); HARVEY, supra note 39; Peter Marcuse, From Critical Urban Theory
to the Right to the City, 13 CITY 185 (2009).
98Hedman et al., supra note 47; MANLEY ET AL., supra note 46.
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achieved in both with sufficient political will.99 Rights and security of tenure are recurring legal
concepts often producing, both in their observance or non-observance, how a city feels. Does it
have high levels of civic engagement and political participation? Are there many people living on
the streets or in inadequate housing? Urban studies do not conventionally study the work done by
legal concepts even though, as Raquel Rolnik reminds us, there is remarkable repetition in cities all
over the world.100
III. Governance Concepts
A third, more conceptual justification for urban law is that cities provide spaces to work out
ongoing puzzles. These include the interaction of territory, sovereignty, and jurisdiction at a man-
ageable legal scale. This is useful for internally-facing legal studies, but also for engaging with
related social science and arts disciplines where legal frameworks are often disregarded in favor
of more theoretical or conceptual frameworks of governance.
There is clearly scope for synthesis in qualitative work on urban decision-making studying the
processes through which government is organized and delivered in urban areas as well as the rela-
tionships between state agencies and civil society. Questions of democratic representation, power,
and decision-making have been longstanding issues of interest, with classic American studies, for
example, producing discordant results. For while Hunter Floyd identified a small, interlocking
elite as governing 1950s Atlanta, Robert Dahl rejected such “sovereignties,” finding instead a
pluralist model of community power in 1980s New Haven.101 Urban governance scholars aim
to understand the interaction of public, private, and community participants, all of which happens
within a legal framework, and usually, structures of democratic participatory involvement, which
may—of course—be more or less ignored depending on the type of decision being made.
Recent urban research indicates, however, that there is more interaction between the legal and
governance worlds than might at first be supposed. In their study of “seeing like an investor” in
London, Mike Raco et al. conclude that complex imaginations of planning and regulation have led
to many firms realizing that “market success results from becoming more deeply embedded in the
local political, social, and regulatory environments in which they are investing.”102 This finding
echoes studies of de-centered governance where lawyers and political scientists are reaching
largely compatible conclusions, including the Foucauldian insight that power and control are dis-
posed amongst social actors and the state, a finding which has been particularly significant in
studies of “street level bureaucrats.”103 For as socio-legal scholars know well, regulatory decisions
are dynamic, both in their drafting and in their enforcement, with processes sometimes informing
the look, feel, or smell of a city as much as planned decisions.
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Municipal budgets provide yet another relatively understudied aspect of law, despite their
undoubted effects on urban areas.104 Cities may have the broadest jurisdictions and range of
powers, but if they lack allocated funds or cannot directly tax their residents, they are limited
in what they can achieve. In a call to update studies of public law in the 1980s, Terence Daintith
identified “imperium” and “dominium” as mechanisms of governance.105 For Daintith,
imperium represents a legislative expression of government deployment of force—or the threat
of force—and respect for rules, while dominium describes policy instruments that involve the
deployment of wealth by government. The two interact, particularly after periods of budget
reductions.106 While localism initiatives can bring much vaunted freedom for local authorities
to set their own imperium regulatory priorities, the ability to enact urban rules reduces when
coffers are bare.
Money matters enormously to legal studies of urban governance. With financial austerity so
devastating in many cities, these concepts prove useful in understanding decisions between man-
datory and discretionary funding choices. This governance distinction is often blurred in practice
as Mia Gray and Anna Barford explain in their study of urban child welfare.107 For while pro-
tection for “at risk” children is mandatory, the funding of youth centers is discretionary, with
many vulnerable children relying on youth centers for socializing and networks of support.108
Understanding the inter-relationship between funding and administrative rationality is critical
to understanding the practice of urban law and governance.
The urban context also provides space for legal scholars to continue to study ongoing questions
of networks, jurisdiction, scale, territory, and sovereignty. So far, these questions have primarily
emerged in studies of international law and settler colonialism, with notable exceptions only in
municipal law.109 Territory, in particular, is understood as a politico-geographic concept, as well as
a process, whose relevance to administrative law is not yet well understood.110 Sometimes, juris-
diction is understood as having fixed geographic boundaries. However, lawyers know well that
jurisdiction can be contested and does not necessarily stop at national boundaries.111 There
are also tensions between globalization and territory, which the city, particularly with an under-
standing of both repeated public and private practices, as well as networks and infrastructures, can
help us to interrogate.112 Lastly, urban law continues to provide a rewarding context in which to
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investigate legal pluralism in both formal and informal settings.113 Cities provide a “bottom up”
way to investigate territory, networks, and jurisdictional scaling in one place, developing a new
scholarly setting for legal studies.
E. Conclusion
Urban law is an emerging field of socio-legal studies where scholars aim to understand how law
produces and is produced by the city. While the urban is understood as a form or place, legal
research can also identify repeated provisions and practices that contribute to urban patterns, par-
ticularly in land use, transportation or infrastructure, even if these techniques are not necessarily
urban in and of themselves. Identifying these repeated legal moves, drawing on specific provisions
and practices, can help identify what is distinctive about “the urban” as a subject of study. Urban
law can also be pragmatic, starting “on the streets”, in quite classic socio-legal fashion, investigat-
ing cities in their everyday form, asking how urban areas are legally produced and co-produced as
well as how better urban laws and legal practices might produce more sustainable, equitable and
hopeful cities.
One of the key difficulties for urban law lies in identifying the right level of analysis, covering
sufficient legal and empirical detail whilst also making the city legible at an urban scale. Focusing
on small-scale case studies can illustrate repeated patterns or trends with investigations explain-
ing, as Don Mitchell notes, “the structured and intense struggles” in urban development proc-
esses.114 Such granular analyses, Mitchell explains, need to be studied alongside an
understanding of the legal framework of law, governance, and practices within which cities oper-
ate.115 As this article has explained, finding an intellectual infrastructure remains a key task for
urban law, recognizing that scalar tensions produce imperfect compromises. Nevertheless, we
should accept this challenge, just as cities continue to grow and develop so too should urban law.
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